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# Aviation Week & Space Technology

Shuttle astronauts Dale A. Gardner  
and Joseph P. Allen retrieve Westar 6



## FAA Cites Over 50 Violations In Grounding South Pacific Island Airways

(South Pacific Island Airways was grounded Oct. 12 by the Federal Aviation Administration in an emergency order that cited more than 50 violations of FAA rules in its operations (AW&ST Nov. 19, p. 32). A National Transportation Safety Board judge, William E. Fowler, has upheld the FAA decision to ground the airline, and South Pacific filed and then withdrew an appeal with NTSB under Section 1005 of the Federal Aviation Act. One violation involves a South Pacific charter flight that nearly strayed into Soviet territory but was intercepted before violating Soviet airspace by two Norwegian air force General Dynamics F-16s. AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY is publishing the FAA grounding order.—Ed.)

### Emergency Order of Revocation

The Order of Suspension of Sept. 28, 1984, is hereby withdrawn and this order is substituted therefor.

It has been determined by the administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, acting by and through his Regional Counsel, that:

1. South Pacific Island Airways, Inc., (hereafter referred to as SPIA) is now and was at all times mentioned herein the holder of Air Carrier Operating Certificate No. 61-PC-45.

2. SPIA is now and was at all times mentioned herein the holder of Operations Specifications allowing it to operate Boeing 707 aircraft in accordance with Part 121 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, and of Operations Specifications allowing it to operate de Havilland of Canada DHC-6 aircraft in accordance with Part 135 of the Federal Aviation Regulations.

3. Between about Apr. 30 and May 20, 1984, a National Air Transportation Inspection was held of SPIA's records, facilities, aircraft and equipment.

4. This inspection disclosed numerous defects and discrepancies resulting in violations of the Federal Aviation Regulations (hereafter referred to as FAR), as described hereafter.

5. The SPIA Operations Manual at Tahiti and Guam did not contain the latest revisions. Specifically, the methods and procedures for maintenance of aircraft weight and center of gravity for Boeing 707 were missing.

6. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 121.137(a)(1).

7. There was no a. c. electrical power cart available at Tonga.

8. The a. c. electrical power cart at Pago Pago did not have a properly functioning governor. Consequently, ground servicing personnel could not control the voltage and frequency within allowable limits.

9. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 121.105.

10. The training program for differences in training for crewmembers and dispatchers for all variations was not included in SPIA's training program.

11. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 121.418.

12. On or about May 6, 1984, the No. 3 oil

temperature gauge on N144SP, a Boeing 707, was written up as malfunctioning on Flight 701 from Honolulu, Hawaii, to Pago Pago.

13. The malfunctioning gauge was not repaired at Pago Pago, and the aircraft was operated as Flight 710 on May 6, 1984, from Pago Pago to Honolulu, with the malfunctioning gauge.

14. As a result, SPIA operated the aircraft in an unairworthy condition and in violation of FAR Sections 121.153(a)(2), 121.303(d)(1) and (2).

15. SPIA's Operations Manual did not contain the name of each management person required by FAR Section 135.37(a). Specifically, it did not list Mark Anderson as Director of Operations.

16. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 135.23(a).

17. SPIA's Operations Manual did not contain adequate procedures to eliminate fuel contamination.

18. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 135.23(j).

19. The briefing cards used to brief passengers on the use of emergency equipment on DHC-6 aircraft indicated that a life raft was aboard each aircraft.

20. Life rafts, however, were carried only on flights from Pago Pago to Tonga.

21. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 135.117(c)(2).

22. SPIA did not maintain for the use of its personnel at Guam and Pago Pago a list of its aircraft that are used in FAR 135 operations.

23. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 135.63(a)(3).

24. On a flight originating at Pago Pago on

May 8, 1984, SPIA used an unsecured ice cooler which partially blocked a required emergency exit on Aircraft N43SP, a DHC-6 aircraft.

25. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 135.87.

26. Between about Apr. 20 and Apr. 29, 1984, SPIA operated Aircraft N9SP, a DHC-6, on about 16 air taxi flights without an operative rotating beacon.

27. Consequently, SPIA operated N9SP when it was in an unairworthy condition.

28. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Sections 91.29(a) and 135.179(a)(1).


29. SPIA's Maintenance Manual for FAR Part 121 Operations did not contain a list of persons performing maintenance in Hong Kong. Moreover, it did not contain a list of persons, outside SPIA's organization, performing its required maintenance inspections. Besides, it did not contain procedures for handling shift changes and work interruptions.

30. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Sections 121.369(a) and (b)(9), 121.133 (a), and 121.135 (a)(1).

31. Between about Mar. 20 and May 23, 1984, SPIA operated a Boeing 707 aircraft, Registration No. N146SP, on 84 flights and for about 483 hr. without complying with the approved engine condition monitoring program by providing CEML reports, as required by SPIA's Operations Specifications and its Maintenance Manual.

32. Between about Apr. 13 and May 23, 1984, SPIA operated a Boeing 707 aircraft, Registration No. N147SP, on 48 flights and for about 259 hr. without complying with the approved engine condition monitoring program by providing CEML reports, as required by

### Company Develops New Microcircuit Packaging System



**New packaging technique** for gallium-arsenide digital microcircuits, designed to allow operation at a clock rate of 4 GHz. (100 picosec. signal rise/fall time), has been developed by GigaBit Logic. By mounting the gallium-arsenide logic chip on a silicon substrate, which contains power supply decoupling capacitors, these can be located much closer, which also reduces inductance from long interconnections. The silicon chip also provides terminating resistors for input signals to minimize reflections and shielded micro-strip transmission lines to reduce cross-talk. GigaBit has applied for a patent on its new packaging technique.

SPIA's Operations Specifications and Maintenance Manual.

33. The operations described above constituted operations in an unairworthy condition.

34. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Sections 43.13 and 121.153(a)(2).

35. On Dec. 3, 1983, SPIA conducted a fleet base inspection on Aircraft N144SP, a 707.

36. SPIA's Maintenance Manual required the use of a "No Go" gauge for a check of the main and auxiliary ground power receptacle pin diameters.

37. SPIA failed to use a "No Go" gauge.

38. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 43.13(a).

39. On Mar. 8, 1984, an inspection was performed by SPIA on N144SP, a Boeing 707.

40. This inspection disclosed the following discrepancies which made the aircraft unairworthy:

a) The bottom of the left-hand inboard segment aft of the No. 2 engine showed a bubble up under temporary repair, as well as delaminations of the outboard trailing edge.

b) The lower fuselage belly skin aft of the forward baggage compartment door bulged around the rivets.

c) The left inboard flap trailing edge was delaminated, and the speed tape covering corrosion was lumpy.

d) No. 4 leading edge flap inboard nose flap hinge was cracked.

e) No. 4 leading edge flap inboard hinge attach point was cracked.

41. SPIA failed to perform maintenance in order to correct these discrepancies, and deferred maintenance contrary to its Maintenance Manual.

42. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 43.13.

43. On Mar. 20, 1984, an OMEGA navigation system was installed on SPIA's Aircraft N146SP, a Boeing 707.

44. On Apr. 12, 1984, a dual OMEGA navigation system, emergency slide lights, a P. A. system for forward and aft flight attendant jump seats, and a conversion of fuel quantity and fuel flow indicators from kilograms to pounds were installed on SPIA's Aircraft N147SP, a Boeing 707.

45. These installations constituted major repairs and alterations requiring the preparation and submission to the Federal Aviation Administration of Form 337 (Major Repair and Alteration).

46. The forms were prepared but they did not include references to FAA approved data.

47. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 121.379(b).

48. SPIA failed to label and mark the ATC transponders installed on Aircraft N147SP to show compliance with the requirements of TSO-C-74b or TSO-C-74c.

49. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 121.345(c).

50. SPIA's Maintenance Manual for its Boeing 707 aircraft required the use of a cardex system for control of airworthiness records.

51. SPIA failed to maintain and produce cardex records for numerous components that required overhaul or function checks, airworthiness directives compliance for Aircraft N146SP and N147SP, and supplemental structure inspections.

52. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 121.380(a).

53. SPIA's Operations Specifications and Maintenance Manual required the performance of oil analysis (SOAP) tests for the engines of its Boeing 707 aircraft.

54. On about Apr. 9, Apr. 12 and Apr. 23, 1984, SPIA received from Brewer Analytical Laboratory engine oil analysis (SOAP) reports for Aircraft Registration Nos. N144SP, N146SP and N145SP. This laboratory was not listed in the Maintenance Manual as a person

with whom SPIA arranged for the performance of the required tests and inspections.

55. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 121.369(a).

56. The SOAP reports received by SPIA, and described above [see 53-55], indicated that the limit criteria used were for diesel truck engines and not for Boeing 707 engines being sampled.

57. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Sections 43.13 and 121.3(c).

58. SPIA's Maintenance Manual required that aircraft flight data recorder tapes be inspected to insure that they were operating properly and reproducing all of the required elements.

59. The flight recorder tape was removed from aircraft N145SP on Feb. 28, 1984, but it was not inspected to insure that the recorder provided a base line, time increments, vertical acceleration and VHF microphone trace lines.

60. The flight recorder tape was removed from N144SP on Apr. 14, 1984, but it was not inspected to insure that the recorder provided acceleration and VHF transmission traces.

61. As of May 7, 1984, SPIA failed to perform inspections to insure that the flight recorders were performing properly.

62. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 43.13(a).

63. SPIA's Weight and Balance Control Manual located in the maintenance department did not contain the required computation of the basic operating weight for aircraft nos. N146SP and N147SP, Boeing 707 aircraft.

64. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Sections 121.133(a), 121.135(b)(2) and 121.135(a)(1).

65. SPIA's training program for Boeing 707 aircraft did not include procedures for training of maintenance inspection personnel.

66. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 121.375.

67. SPIA's Maintenance Manual for FAR Part 135 operations required that all life vests be inspected and be given a functional inflation test every 12 months.

68. SPIA failed to inspect and check more than about 3% of the vests.

69. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 43.13(a).

70. SPIA failed to provide adequate maintenance equipment and materials at Guam for the maintenance of its DHC-6 aircraft.

71. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 135.425(b).

72. SPIA's Maintenance Manual for FAR Part 135 operations required that spare parts be properly tagged to determine whether they were serviceable.

73. About 40 spare parts at Pago Pago were found not to be tagged.

74. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 43.13(a).

75. SPIA's Maintenance Manual required a 600-hr. ramp check on the VOR systems of its DHC-6 aircraft.

76. A ramp check was performed on Nov. 26, 1983, at Guam on Aircraft N9SP.

77. SPIA, however, failed to perform a VOR accuracy check.


78. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 43.13(a).

79. SPIA installed a mechanic box end type wrench as a cabin door entrance handle on Aircraft N43SP, a DHC-6 aircraft.

80. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 43.13(a).

81. SPIA failed to maintain and produce

## Ford Test-Fires Projectile With On-Board Computer



Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp. has successfully test-fired a 40-mm. guided projectile that is equipped with an on-board computer designed to maneuver off the projectile's initial ballistic trajectory. The rectangular opening visible here—located near the nose of the projectile—is one of two ports that provide in-flight guidance for the device through the preprogrammed ram air guidance system. The projectile, which was fired from a special test cannon at a site near San Juan Capistrano, Calif., was developed for the Air Force Armament Laboratory by Ford Aerospace's Aeronautics Div. in Newport Beach, Calif. The projectile measures approximately 17 in. long.

training records for mechanics G. Hughes, W. E. Prouse, E. Guarino, E. Ibasco and V. Chanel.

82. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 135.433.

83. The Operations Specifications for the DHC-6 aircraft required an overhaul of the fuel boost pumps at 6,500 hr.

84. As of May 17, 1984, SPIA operated Aircraft N43SP when the overhaul time for the fuel boost pump, Serial No. H1529H, was exceeded by about 100 hr. SPIA therefore operated the aircraft in an unairworthy condition.

85. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Sections 135.5 and 91.29(a).

86. South Pacific Island Airways' Operations Specifications for FAR Part 135 operations required the overhaul of aircraft components at various stated times.

87. SPIA failed to maintain and produce records for approximately 17 components showing compliance with above Operations Specifications.

88. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 135.439(a)(2)(iii).

89. SPIA's maintenance records indicate that the following aircraft was not properly maintained in that malfunctions were not corrected:

Between Apr. 1, and Apr. 21, 1984, on seven occasions it was reported that the nose wheel steering of Aircraft N28SP was malfunctioning. On May 1, 1984, the nose wheel steering cable broke.

90. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Sections 43.13(a).

91. SPIA's Maintenance Manual required that maintenance releases for DHC-6 aircraft be signed by appropriate personnel.

92. SPIA's maintenance personnel only initialed the maintenance releases.

93. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 135.443(b).

In addition to the findings of the National Air Transportation Inspection, we have received reports of investigations showing FAR violations by SPIA as follows:

(Case No. 84WP610025)

94. On or about Mar. 25, 1984, SPIA operated Aircraft N146SP, a Boeing 707, between Honolulu, Hawaii, and Vancouver, Canada, as Flight HK101.

95. Prior to departure from Honolulu, the load manifest form was improperly computed.

96. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 121.665.

(Case No. 84WP610026)


97. On or about Mar. 20, 1984, SPIA operated Aircraft N146SP, a Boeing 707, between Guam and Honolulu.

98. Life preservers equipped with approved locator lights were not installed on the aircraft, and were not available for the 72 occupants of the aircraft. SPIA therefore operated the aircraft in an unairworthy condition.

99. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Sections 121.153(a)(2), 121.303(d)(2) and 121.339(a)(1). (Case No. 84WP610005)

100. Between about Nov. 26 and Dec. 3, 1983, SPIA operated Aircraft N144SP, a

## Lockheed Investigates Solar-Powered Platform



**Solar-powered, high-altitude** unmanned aircraft, intended to operate for at least a year at altitudes of about 65,000 ft. as a platform for sensors or communications relay payload, is under investigation by Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., funded in part by NASA's Langley Research Center. Surplus electric energy collected during daylight from solar cells mounted on wingtips and vertical stabilizers would

separate water into oxygen and hydrogen for use at night by a fuel cell to generate electric energy. Propeller, measuring about 40 ft. in diameter, is expected to operate at more than 90% efficiency. The payload, carried in an underslung pod, could weigh up to 200 lb. At 65,000-ft. altitude, solar-power generated thrust would be sufficient for the aircraft to hold its position.

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Boeing 707 aircraft, on about 10 flights and for about 49 hr. with the main cabin aft flight attendant's jump seat malfunctioning and repairs deferred.

101. SPIA, moreover, operated the same aircraft between Dec. 28, 1983, and Jan. 5, 1984, on 22 flights and for about 101 hr. when the nose wheel steering was malfunctioning, and its repair deferred.

102. Between Nov. 11 and Nov. 14, 1983, SPIA operated Aircraft N145SP, a Boeing 707 aircraft, on about 26 flights and for about 128 hr. with the captain's windshield and the copilot's side window heat inoperative and their repair deferred.

103. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Sections 121.303(d)(1), 121.303(d)(2) and 121.153(a)(2).

(Case No. 84WP610045)

104. On June 9, 1984, SPIA operated a Boeing 707 aircraft, Registration No. 144SP, as Flight 101 between Vancouver, Canada, and Honolulu, Hawaii. On June 10, 1984, SPIA operated this aircraft designated as Flight 10 between Honolulu and Vancouver. On June 11, 1984, SPIA operated this aircraft as Flight 701 between Honolulu and Pago Pago, and on the return flight from Pago Pago and Honolulu.

105. On the flights described above [see 104] SPIA assigned and used R. Rypel as first officer.

106. At the time of the above flights R. Rypel was not qualified to act as a pilot, as required by FAR Sections 121.433(b) and 121.433(c)(1)(i).

107. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Sections 121.433(b) and 121.433(c)(1)(i).

108. On or about Sept. 29, 1984, SPIA operated a Boeing 707 aircraft, N145SP, as Flight HK 021, on a passenger-carrying charter flight from Anchorage, Alaska, to Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

109. The flight was dispatched and intended as a nonstop flight using the Polar Route.

110. Flight HK 021 was operated within the area of magnetic compass unreliability, an area known for unreliability of magnetic navigational aids and systems.

111. SPIA's Operations Specifications required the use of approved free gyro-grid navigation procedures in areas of magnetic compass unreliability.

112. SPIA's Operations Specifications required for use of free gyro-grid navigation procedures either (1) that the flight crew successfully accomplished a proficiency check in such navigation procedures for the area in which Flight HK 021 was operated, or (2) that the navigation of Flight HK 021 was performed under the supervision of an Omega Navigation System check airman qualified and approved for such navigational procedures for the area in which Flight HK 021 was operated.

113. At the time of the flight, Aircraft No. N145SP was equipped with two Litton Model 211 Omega/VLF navigational systems.

114. At the time of the flight, the flight crew of Flight HK 021 had not successfully accomplished, within the preceding six months, the proficiency check described above [see 112].

115. The navigation of Flight HK 021 using free gyro-grid navigation procedures was not performed under the supervision of a qualified and approved check airman, as described above [see 112].

116. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 121.3. It also violated FAR Section 91.9, in that it operated Flight HK 021 in a careless or

reckless manner so as to endanger the life and property of another.

117. During the flight described in paragraph 108 above, flight HK 021 made a substantial and hazardous deviation from its intended track.

118. As a result of this deviation, Flight HK 021 entered Norwegian airspace, and was operated within 50 mi. from and heading towards the airspace of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

119. The Norwegian Air Force dispatched two [General Dynamics F-16] fighter jets to intercept Flight HK 021 in order to alert it as to its position and heading, and in order to attempt to prevent Flight HK 021 from entering USSR airspace.

120. Flight HK 021 changed course, and then proceeded in a generally southerly direction, making an unscheduled refueling stop at Copenhagen, Denmark.

121. As a result, SPIA violated FAR Section 91.9, in that it operated Flight HK 021 in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life and property of another.

By reason of the foregoing, SPIA:

a. Failed to exercise the degree of care, judgment and responsibility required of the holder of an air carrier operating certificate.

b. Has demonstrated that it presently lacks the qualifications required of a holder of an air carrier operating certificate.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, the administrator has determined that an emergency requiring immediate action exists with respect to safety in air commerce, and he has determined that safety in air commerce and the

public interest require the immediate revocation of Air Carrier Operating Certificate No. 61-PC-45 and any other air carrier operating certificate held by SPIA on an emergency basis. Now, therefore, it is ordered, pursuant to the authority vested in the administrator by Sections 609 and 1005 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, that:

(1) Effective immediately, Air Carrier Operating Certificate No. 61-PC-45 and any other air carrier operating certificate now held by SPIA is hereby revoked on an emergency basis;

(2) Said certificate be surrendered immediately by mail or delivery to the Regional Counsel of the Federal Aviation Administration, Los Angeles, Calif. 90009 or at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Lawndale, Calif.

DEWITTE T. LAWSON, JR., Regional Counsel

### Appeal

This Order may be appealed by the filing of an appeal with the National Transportation Safety Board, Office of Administrative Law Judges, Washington, D. C., within 10 days of the date of service of this order. In view of the fact that your certificate has been revoked on an emergency basis, and the administrator has determined that safety in air commerce and the public interest require the immediate effectiveness of this order, the revocation of said certificate shall remain effective during the pendency of any appeal proceedings before the National Transportation Safety Board.

In the event of an appeal of this order, Part 821 of the National Transportation Safety Board's Rules of Practice will be applicable to and govern the proceedings. □

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